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Henry Sidgwick taught G.E. Moore as an undergraduate at the University of  Cambridge.1 
Moore found Sidgwick’s personality less than attractive and his lectures “rather dull.”2 
Still, philosophically speaking, Moore absorbed a great deal from Sidgwick. In the 
Preface to the Trinity College Prize Fellowship dissertation that he submitted in 1898, 
just two years after graduation, he wrote “For my ethical views it will be obvious how 
much I owe to Prof. Sidgwick.”3 Later, in Principia Ethica, Moore credited Sidgwick with 
having “first clearly exposed the [naturalistic] fallacy” – a fallacy putatively committed 
when one defines naturalistically or super‐naturalistically “good” – which was one of  
the book’s main ambitions (PE, p. 39; also pp. 17, 59).4 It is therefore unsurprising that 
Moore remarks in the intellectual autobiography he wrote years later that “From … 
[Sidgwick’s] published works … I have gained a good deal, and his clarity and his belief  
in Common Sense were very sympathetic to me.”5
This influence did not, however, prevent Moore from registering disagreements with 
Sidgwick, the sharpest of  which concern the viability of  egoism and the nature of  the 
good. The disagreements between Sidgwick and Moore speak to many important moral 
theoretical issues arising both within and without the utilitarian tradition in ethical 
thinking. Because the two share much in common, a critical comparison of  them on a 
range of  moral philosophical questions proves instructive. It will tell us in particular 
something about the general direction of  ethical thinking in the utilitarian tradition at 
the dawn of  the twentieth century.
This chapter has four parts. Part I compares the versions of  utilitarianism to which 
Sidgwick and Moore subscribed. Part II examines the arguments each provides for the 
view. Part III discusses their conflicting theories of  value. Part IV sums things up.








Sidgwick and Moore share a commitment to some version of  utilitarianism. It is against 
this shared background that their disagreements occur. Sidgwick endorses the classical 
utilitarian view: “the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively 
right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of  happiness on the whole; that is, 
taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct” (ME, p. 411). By 
“greatest amount of  happiness” he means “greatest possible surplus of  pleasure over 
pain” (ME, p. 413).
This view is divisible into two main parts. Sidgwick and Moore agree normative 
 ethical investigations tell us what things are non‐instrumentally good (or evil) and what 
we ought (or ought not) to do (ME, pp. 2–3; PE, p. 142ff.). Sidgwick’s view is that all and 
only pleasure has non‐instrumental value and all and only pain has non‐instrumental 
disvalue and that one’s only basic obligation is to maximize surplus pleasure for the 
aggregate of  sentient beings. He tries to work out a consistent version of  this view. He 
does so in part by distinguishing it from the versions of  classical utilitarianism found in 
Bentham and in Mill.
Bentham and Mill agree that all and only pleasure (pain) has non‐instrumental 
value (disvalue); however, they differ over the dimensions of  pleasure relevant to deter-
mining its value. Bentham holds that the value of  a pleasure when considered alone 
depends exclusively on quantitative considerations: the more pleasure the better.6 The 
view has counter‐intuitive implications. Compare two lives: (i) An average‐length 
human life that is rich in a surplus of  the pleasures of  achievement, unified and general 
understanding, and long‐standing and deep relationships. (ii) The life of  a primitive sen-
tient creature that is rich in a surplus of  only very unsophisticated bodily pleasures. 
Bentham is bound to hold that if  the latter life contains on balance more surplus plea-
sure (say, because it is very long), it is the better life.7
Mill balked at this implication. He argued that a hedonist could resist it with consis-
tency by arguing that the value of  a pleasure depends on quantitative and qualitative 
considerations. Mill argued in specific that some kinds of  pleasures (e.g. of  the intellect 
or of  the imagination) are better in themselves.8 On this basis, he argued that the former 
life is better. It contains pleasures that are of  higher quality, and hence better in them-
selves as pleasures, and these outrank the primitive or lower pleasures present in the 
second life.
Sidgwick sides with quantitative hedonism. He gives Benthamite reasons to favor so‐
called “higher” pleasures (ME, p. 94). Sidgwick rejects Mill’s qualitative view on the 
grounds that the introduction of  the dimension of  quality is inconsistent with the main 
tenet of  hedonism: that the value of  a pleasure depends exclusively on its pleasantness. 
If  we introduce factors other than pleasurableness for the purpose of  valuing pleasure, 
we “are clearly introducing a non‐hedonic ground of  preference,” and this involves 
abandoning hedonism (ME, p. 95). Moore agreed (PE, pp. 79–80).
But Sidgwick does not accept Bentham’s view en bloc. The latter argues that the value 
of  a pleasure when considered alone is determined by its intensity, duration, certainty, 
and propinquity (or location in time). Sidgwick agrees that intensity and duration 
matter to the value of  a pleasure (ME, p. 124). He rejects without argument the claim 
that propinquity is directly relevant: “proximity is a property which it is reasonable to 
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disregard except in so far as it diminishes uncertainty” (ME, p. 124n1; italics in original). 
For Sidgwick, it is self‐evident that “the mere difference of  priority and posteriority in 
time is not a reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of  one 
moment than to that of  another” (ME, p. 381).
It is not clear that Sidgwick rejects Bentham’s claim that certainty matters to the 
value of  a pleasure. He holds that if  intensity and duration are commensurable with 
each other, we may, once we are clear how certain a pleasure happens to be, determine 
how it affects the “value” of  a pleasure (ME, p. 124n1). This suggests that certainty, like 
intensity, affects the value of  a pleasure itself  rather than, for example, the rationality of  
action taken to secure it. That certainty affects the value itself  is inconsistent with hedo-
nism, however, since the value of  a pleasure is then affected by something in addition to 
pleasurableness.
Sidgwick does not, then, succeed in working out a completely consistent quantitative 
hedonism. As he notes, “consistency requires that pleasures should be sought in 
proportion to their pleasantness; and therefore, the less pleasant consciousness must 
not be preferred to the more pleasant, on the ground of  any other qualities that it may 
possess” (ME, p. 121).
It is not difficult for him to achieve consistency, however. He simply has to reject 
Bentham’s claim that certainty and propinquity make a difference to the value of  a 
pleasure on the same grounds that he rejects the appeal to quality: as making pleasure’s 
value depend on things other than pleasantness. This is anyway a more plausible way 
to dispose of  the parts of  Bentham’s view that seem to conflict with quantitative 
hedonism.
There is another way in which Sidgwick deviates from Mill and Bentham. In outlin-
ing utilitarianism, Mill and Bentham suggest that the morality of  actions depends on 
what has or appears to have a tendency to promote surplus aggregate happiness rather 
than on what in fact maximizes surplus aggregate happiness.
In Utilitarianism, Mill says that: “Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds 
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they 
tend to promote the reverse of  happiness.”9 In the Introduction Bentham says that “By 
the principle of  utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of  every 
action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish 
the happiness of  the party whose interest is in question.”10
Sidgwick’s version of  utilitarianism makes no mention of  tendencies. This is likely in 
part because an action might have a tendency to promote a good outcome and fail to do 
so. For Sidgwick, this means it is wrong. What he cares about is an action’s actual 
results, not what appear to be its results (or tendencies). In addition, he embraces 
the maximization of  happiness rather than merely its promotion or augmentation. 
Something might promote/augment but not maximize happiness.11
Sidgwick may not consistently embrace the utilitarian view of  rightness. He notes 
that there are cases in which there is more than one way in which the same quantity of  
happiness might be distributed to the same number of  people (ME, p. 416). This leads 
him to wonder which of  these distributions is most desirable. It might seem strange for 
him to wonder this; surely for Sidgwick the answer is that the most desirable distribu-
tion is that which maximizes surplus aggregate happiness. The difficulty with this 
response is that there exist cases where, because of  the indefinite nature of  hedonistic 
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calculations, it cannot be determined with “mathematical precision” which of  one’s 
options maximizes surplus happiness for the aggregate (ME, p. 416). It will appear in 
such cases that two or more options produce equal quantities of  surplus happiness; it is 
difficult in such cases to decide what to do simply by reference to utilitarianism. In these 
cases, “it becomes practically important to ask whether any mode of  distributing a 
given quantum of  happiness is better than any other” (ME, p. 416).
In reply, Sidgwick says utilitarianism must be supplemented by “some principle of  
Just or Right distribution” (ME, pp. 416–417). The most plausible such principle is that 
of  “pure equality” (ME, p. 417). This is the principle most utilitarians accept and it 
requires “no special justification” (ME, p. 417): “it must be reasonable to treat any one 
man in the same way as any other, if  there be no reason apparent for treating him 
 differently” (ME, p. 417).
The view is that in the sort of  cases that concern Sidgwick the more equitable distri-
bution is considered better. To illustrate, suppose one faces a choice  between the follow-
ing two distributions. (The letters stand for individuals and the numbers in brackets 
stand for their surplus happiness level.)
O1: A (6) B (6) C (6)
O2: A (14) B (2) C (2)
Sidgwick says that O1 is the more desirable of  the two distributions. We ought, then, to 
produce it.
This suggestion might be problematic. If  Sidgwick endorses a principle of  equality 
and a principle enjoining “seeking the greatest happiness on the whole” (ME, p. 416), 
his will be a pluralistic view. This leaves open the possibility that the two principles 
might conflict in practice. He might suggest that no such conflict arises as the principle 
of  equality is confined to cases in which the quantum of  happiness of  two or more 
options appears equal. However, to some, this appears “arbitrary and doubtful.”12 Why 
think that equality matters only in cases of  this sort? In addition, it is not clear that 
Sidgwick is right that the principle’s use requires no justification. There are, after all, 
other principles we might use – e.g. flip a coin. If  so, Sidgwick’s endorsement of  pure 
equality lacks a (specifically utilitarian) justification.13
Sidgwick has three replies. First, he provides an argument for utilitarianism that 
involves appeal to certain philosophical intuitions, that is, self‐evident propositions that 
are abstract and universal (ME, p. 379).14 He argues that the first principle of  utilitari-
anism may be inferred from two such propositions. One of  these is that:
the good of  any one individual is of  no more importance, from the point of  view (if  I may 
say so) of  the Universe, than the good of  any other; unless, that is, there are special 
grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the 
other (ME, p. 382).
Sidgwick might appeal to this for justification of  “pure” equality rather than the 
Benthamite dictum that “everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one” 
(ME, p. 417).
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On one reading, this intuition holds that concern for each individual’s good is equal, 
or there are quantitative differences between the goods that justify unequal concern.15 
In the case that Sidgwick is considering there are no “special grounds for believing that 
more good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the other” (ME, p. 382). His are 
cases in which there is “no cognizable difference between the quantities of  happiness 
involved in two sets of  consequences respectively” (ME, p. 416; italics in original). In 
such cases the axiom appears to warrant equal concern. Since this axiom plays a role in 
grounding (or providing a rational basis for) utilitarianism (ME, pp. 387, 388), Sidgwick 
has in his grounding a solution to the problem he confronts. This principle seems to jus-
tify equal treatment in these cases. It does so in a way that avoids the charge that 
invoking the principle only in these cases is arbitrary, for it is only in these cases that 
there are no “special grounds.” 
Second, Sidgwick might note the connection between equality and utility, or rather 
the connection in practice between inequality and disutility. If  this connection exists, 
there is reason for utilitarians to favor equitable distributions of  happiness in the sort of  
case that Sidgwick discusses and more generally, that is, even in cases where it is not 
hard to tell which of  two or more options maximizes aggregate happiness. Sidgwick 
seems to think that the commitment to equal treatment is part of  common‐sense 
morality (ME, p. 447).16 Since he believes that the morality of  common sense is uncon-
sciously utilitarian (ME, pp. 424, 463), and that adherence to it is useful for the purpose 
of  promoting utility over the long run (ME, p. xxiii), it would be reasonable for him to 
appeal to equal treatment in the case that he envisages, among others. He is, after all, 
thinking in that case of  how to reason in practice (ME, p. 416).
Third, Sidgwick notes that a utilitarian is not able to construct a completely new 
system of  moral rules de novo for individuals in the current order, for such individ-
uals already have a morality. Instead, the utilitarian has to work with this existing 
morality:
[the utilitarian] must start, speaking broadly, with the existing social order, and the exist-
ing morality as a part of  that order: and in deciding the question whether any divergence 
from this code is to be recommended, must consider chiefly the immediate consequences 
of  such divergence, upon a society in which such a code is conceived generally to subsist 
(ME, p. 474).
If  the “pure equality” that Sidgwick accepts is part of  this code, one can see why he 
might advocate it at least initially and retain it in cases where there are no reasons to 
reject it. As he notes, men have “a disinterested aversion to unreason … [and] to any 
kind of  inferiority to others” (ME, p. 447). This might provide some justification, in any 
case, for adopting it.
Moore accepts what in his time was referred to as ideal utilitarianism.17 He rejects 
hedonism (PE, pp. 74–96; E, p. 123ff.). He thinks it is in flagrant conflict with common 
sense.18 He can then (with consistency) accept that there are higher pleasures (PE, pp. 
94–95; E, pp. 23–25, 123–124). He thinks there are a plurality of  goods and that they 
are all complex organic unities (PE, p. 189; E, pp. 129–130). The value of  these wholes 
is not equivalent to the sum of  the value of  the parts of  the wholes (PE, pp. 27–30, 93, 
184; E, p. 124ff.). Among the most valuable of  these wholes are aesthetic enjoyment 
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and personal affection (PE, pp. 188, 189). He argues (at least in Principia) that there are 
three great evils: loving what is bad (as in lasciviousness and cruelty), hating what is 
good (as in contempt and envy), and consciousness of  pain (PE, pp. 207–214). These 
are all organic unities (PE, p. 208).
On the question of  what we ought to do, broadly speaking, Moore agrees with 
Sidgwick. Early in Principia, Moore states that
to assert that a certain line of  conduct is, at a given time, absolutely right or obligatory, is 
obviously to assert that more good or less evil will exist in the world, if  it be adopted than if  
anything else be done instead (PE, p. 25; also PE, p. 147).
Later, he distinguishes between right and duty/obligation. To say that an action is right 
is to say it “will not cause less good than any possible alternative” (PE, p. 148; italics in 
original; also E, pp. 14–15). Moore thinks it is possible that in some cases more than one 
action is right. This happens, for example, when two or more actions open to one produce 
equal quantities of  surplus value and all other actions produce less surplus value (E, p. 
14). To say that an action is one’s duty or what one ought to do, on the other hand, is to 
say it “will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative” (PE, p. 
148; also E, pp. 14–15). In Ethics, he urges that “it must always be our duty to do what will 
produce the best effects upon the whole” (E, p. 121; italics in original; also pp. 33, 99).
Moore is, then, clear in his commitment to maximization, he rejects all talk of  
 tendencies and he thinks that the morality of  actions depends on their actual rather 
than their expected or apparent results (E, p. 99). In these respects, he agrees with 
Sidgwick. Following him, Moore expresses the canonical form of  what is now called 
consequentialism.
Note that in making the distinction between ought and duty and right, Moore avoids 
puzzling over the kind of  scenario (vexing to Sidgwick) in which two actions appear to 
 produce on balance equal quantities of  surplus happiness (or value). In the case of  such 
ties Moore says no action is one’s duty. Instead, both actions are right (or appear so) and so 
taking either course of  action is permissible. One’s duty is to do one or other of  the actions. 
Moore does not feel the need to appeal to extra considerations to decide what to do.
Moore was not, however, always consistent in his embrace of  utilitarianism. In the 
Appendix to the Trinity College Prize Fellowship dissertation that he submitted in 1897, 
Moore took aim at Sidgwick’s hedonism and his definition of  pleasure.19 In an earlier ver-
sion of  the Appendix, Moore attacked classical utilitarianism more generally.20 His attempt 
was to show that its verdicts about particular acts conflict with common‐sense morality.21
He considers a case in which a man and a young boy are capsized at sea. There is a 
very low probability of  either being saved. The man might “slightly” increase the boy’s 
chances of  being saved by lifting him up. This would, however, lower his own chances of  
survival. (Moore does not say by how much.) He supposes that the man refuses to help 
the boy in order to keep his chances of  survival as high as possible. Both, Moore says, 
end up drowning. He holds that the man’s refusal is judged harshly by common sense: 
“Common sense would … judge that the man had behaved just as wrongly, as if  he had 
refused to help the boy, in a case where there was a very strong probability that, with 
that help, both might escape, where his refusal was witnessed, and where he himself  
escaped easily.”22
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Moore suggests that classical utilitarianism can capture the harsh judgment of  
common sense in the “strong probability” case (SP). The classical utilitarian can appeal 
to a number of  consequences to justify harsh condemnation of  the man who does not 
help: the loss of  the boy’s life, the bad example it would set for others witnessing the 
man, and the “weakening” of  his “disposition to act morally.”23 The difficulty, Moore 
says, is that the classical “Utilitarian calculus” cannot capture the common‐sense judg-
ment that the man is to be condemned just as harshly for not helping in the case where 
he and the boy are capsized at sea (CS). Moore thinks that classical utilitarianism will 
condemn the man less harshly for failing to aid in CS because there is a low probably 
that by helping he will save the boy, set a good example and maintain his resolve to do 
the right thing. This conflicts with common‐sense morality, according to Moore, for it 
does not vary the harshness of  the condemnation across the two cases. His worry is 
that, on classical utilitarianism, the harshness of  the condemnation varies with the 
probability of  securing the best outcome.
This is a very puzzling case. It is not clear that classical utilitarianism would vary 
the condemnation in the two cases based on the probability of  the consequences 
“ensuing.”24 However, it might vary the judgment in the cases based on the expected or 
actual effects of  passing it. Suppose, then, Moore is right that common sense judges the 
man equally harshly in both cases and that classical utilitarianism fails to capture this. 
If  this is the worry, it appears to stand when one accepts ideal as opposed to classical 
utilitarianism. Moore’s criticism appears to hold even if  one rejects hedonism. If  
classical utilitarianism conflicts with common‐sense morality in this case, it is likely 
that ideal utilitarianism does, too, for the latter is at least open to varying judgment 
based on actual or expected value. Therefore, Moore’s utilitarianism conflicts with 
common‐sense morality.
Like Sidgwick, Moore was not, then, always consistent in embracing utilitarianism. 
Fortunately, Moore left this example out of  the final version of  the 1897 dissertation. 
This might be because he noticed the conflict. However, this is only one reason why he 
might have done so. It is worth pointing out that Moore’s account of  the common‐sense 
reaction in his case is open to question. It is not obvious that common sense will 
 automatically “reprobate” the man equally harshly in both cases for not helping.25
In his careful analysis of  common‐sense morality, Sidgwick notes that we distin-
guish between what we ought to do (or refrain from doing) and what we ought to be 
blamed for doing (or failing to do) (ME, p. 221). The standards, he notes, are “laxer” in 
the latter case.26
To illustrate he mentions two cases. The first involves those “in which we refrain from 
blaming others for the omission of  acts which we do not doubt that we in their place 
should have thought it our duty to perform” (ME, p. 221). Whether the other is blamed 
in such cases depends, Sidgwick remarks, on “what men ordinarily do, and by a social 
instinct as to the practical effects of  expressed moral approbation and disapprobation: 
we think that moral progress will on the whole be best promoted by our praising acts 
that are above the level of  ordinary practice, and confining our censure – at least if  pre-
cise and particular – to acts that fall clearly below this standard” (ME, p. 221).
Applied to Moore’s case one might reason that, because not helping in SP involves 
clearly falling below the standards of  ordinary practice, blame is apposite and likely to 
be effective. Since not saving in CS does not involve clearly falling below ordinary 
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 practice (since helping apparently involves some sacrifice) it is far from clear that cen-
sure is appropriate or likely to be effective. Common sense might hold, then, that the 
harshness of  censure of  the man varies across the two cases.
Sidgwick’s second case involves actions which “we cannot lay down definitely 
that they ought or ought not to be done or forborne, unless we have the complete 
knowledge of  circumstances which a man commonly possesses only in his own case, 
and not in that of  other men” (ME, p. 221). It is likely that common‐sense morality 
denies that the morality of  the Moore’s two cases is clearly the same. In SP there is no 
or low cost to the man and the benefits great. It is obvious that he ought to help the 
boy. This looks like a case of  what we might call, following Sidgwick’s account of  
common‐sense morality, “strict duty” (ME, p. 492). In CS there is (unspecified) cost 
to the man and some benefit (unspecified) to the boy. It seems unclear that he ought 
to help and so unclear that he ought to be harshly censured. Indeed, helping in this 
case looks like an instance of  what, following Sidgwick again, we call the “admi-
rable” or ideal (ME, p. 492).
Sidgwick thinks that classical utilitarianism can capture these aspects of  common‐
sense morality. He notes that though a utilitarian
must hold that it is always wrong for a man knowingly to do anything other than what he 
believes to be most conducive to Universal Happiness … it seems practically expedient, – and 
therefore indirectly reasonable on Utilitarian principles,  –  to retain, in judging even the 
strictly voluntary conduct of  others, the distinction between a part that is praiseworthy 
and admirable and a part that is merely right: because it is natural to us to compare any 
individual’s character or conduct not with our highest ideal – Utilitarian or otherwise – but 
with a certain average standard and to admire what rises above the standard; and it seems 
ultimately conducive to the general happiness that such natural sentiments of  admiration 
should be encouraged and developed. For human nature seems to require the double stim-
ulus of  praise and blame from others, in order to the best performance of  duty that it can at 
present attain: so that the ‘social sanction’ would be less effective if  it became purely penal. 
Indeed, since the pains of  remorse and disapprobation are in themselves to be avoided, it is 
plain that the Utilitarian construction of  a Jural morality is essentially self‐limiting; that is, 
it prescribes its own avoidance of  any department of  conduct in which the addition that 
can be made to happiness through the enforcement of  rules sustained by social penalties 
appears doubtful or inconsiderable. In such departments, however, the aesthetic phase of  
morality may still reasonably find a place; we may properly admire and praise where it 
would be inexpedient to judge and condemn. We may conclude, then, that it is reasonable 
for a Utilitarian to praise any conduct more felicific in its tendency than what an average 
man would do under the given circumstances: – being aware of  course that the limit down 
to which praiseworthiness extends must be relative to the particular state of  moral progress 
reached by mankind generally in his age and country; and that it is desirable to make con-
tinual efforts to elevate this standard (ME, pp. 492–493).
If  classical utilitarianism can capture a plausible common‐sense view of  Moore’s 
case, he is wrong that this is a case in which common‐sense morality conflicts with the 
verdicts of  the utilitarian calculus.
It is interesting that Moore tries to impugn classical utilitarianism by noting conflict 
with the deontic judgments of  common‐sense morality. It is not typical of  him to seri-
ously consider cases in which common‐sense morality renders deontic verdicts 
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conflicting with utilitarianism. This might in part explain why he took it out. (That is, 
he might have noted the conflict but been unmoved.) In general, he is quite hostile to 
such common‐sense attitudes.
He notes that the very opposite of  his utilitarian view “has been generally prevalent 
in Ethics. ‘The right’ and ‘the useful’ have been supposed to be at least capable of  
conflicting with one another, and, at all events, to be essentially distinct. It has been 
characteristic of  a certain school of  moralists, as of  moral common sense, to declare 
that the end will never justify the means” (PE, pp. 146–147; italics in original). Moore 
is thinking here of  views, like Immanuel Kant’s, on which it is sometimes one’s absolute 
duty to do less than the best. On such views, it is, for example, wrong to make a false 
promise even if  by making it one could produce on balance greater surplus value. In 
Principia, he dismisses this view as false by definition (PE, p. 147): for to say that X is 
one’s duty just is to say that X will produce on balance the best outcome. In Ethics, he 
considers the view that is it sometimes wrong to do what is best (as in justice may be 
done though the heavens may fall). He says that such a view is “commonly held” (E, p. 
90). He rejects this view as self‐evidently wrong (E, pp. 93–94).
Moore’s lack of  regard for common‐sense intuitions about right and wrong might be 
traced to the fact that he considers only very extreme rivals to consequentialism, views 
on which there are absolute duties. He was not yet aware of  Ross’s view on which there 
exist only defeasible constraints on promoting aggregate good.27 (This is also true of  
Sidgwick.) That you have made a promise is only in some cases a decisive reason to keep 
it even if  by breaking it you can produce on balance more surplus value for the 
aggregate. In some cases, you might be required break a promise on grounds of  benefi-
cence. Nevertheless, the short shrift he gives to deontic common‐sense intuitions – intu-
itions about what one has a duty or one ought to do or forbear – contrasts with this 
treatment of  common‐sense intuitions about axiological matters. Moore is quite liberal 
in his appeal to intuitions in defending views about non‐instrumental value (disvalue).28 
He attacks hedonism on the grounds that it runs contrary to common sense (PE, p. 95; 
E, pp. 123–124). In his support of  his own view he frequently appeals to common sense 
or what “we” think (e.g. PE, pp. 224, 188).
This puts Moore in an unstable position. There seems on the face of  it little reason to 
be liberal and accommodating of  common‐sense morality in the case of  defending one’s 
theory of  value but not in the case of  defending one’s theory of  rightness.29 There is at 
least something here that calls out for explanation.
By contrast, Sidgwick is less dismissive of  common‐sense views about rightness, 
partly because he thinks utilitarianism gains some kind of  support from coincidence 
with common‐sense morality (ME, p. 419ff.).30 and partly because he relies on the 
 practical “guidance afforded my Common Sense” as a remedy for the “practical imper-
fection in many cases of  the guidance of  the Utilitarian calculus” (ME, p. xxiii).
In their commentary on Moore’s example, Thomas Baldwin and Consuelo Preti note 
it is “not as decisive as it needs to be” against utilitarianism.31 They provide a distinct 
explanation for its lack of  success and possible exclusion from the final draft of  the 
 dissertation, namely, that it is “not clear how far the duty to help others extends to a 
duty of  potential self‐sacrifice, and ‘common sense’ surely refrains from reprobation in 
situations of  this kind.”32 They note that nevertheless Moore’s “underlying point, that 
utilitarianism conflicts with common sense morality, seems right.”33
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It is not clear whether Baldwin and Preti mean to say utilitarianism or classical util-
itarianism. Moore, of  course, is an exponent of  a variety of  utilitarianism. If  their point 
is that Moore is wrong that common sense would not reprobate the man harshly in CS 
because it holds that there are limits on self‐sacrifice, they have a point, but it is not one 
that Moore seems keen to recognize.
Indeed, recognizing that there are limits on self‐sacrifice hurts Moore. Suppose that 
it is true that common sense places limits on the self‐sacrifice that morality can exact 
from an individual and that this is why it is not clear that in CS the man ought to help 
the boy and why failure to help might not be followed by reprobation. This would sug-
gest, perhaps, that common‐sense morality includes, as Sidgwick notes, reasons of  
beneficence (ME, p. 238ff.) and of  prudence (ME, pp. 7, 119, 419, 498; cf. 500). 
Common sense might affirm that in CS there is a reason to help the boy, but that it is 
outweighed by reasons of  prudence. It might be possible for utilitarianism to accommo-
date this thought in the way Sidgwick suggests above. But there are going to be clear 
cases in which utilitarian conclusions conflict with common‐sense views about the 
limits of  self‐sacrifice and where it will be hard for common sense to agree that one 
ought to sacrifice one’s own happiness.
Sidgwick is alive to this worry:
Suppose a man finds that a regard for the general good – Utilitarian Duty – demands from 
him a sacrifice, or extreme risk, of  life. There are perhaps one or two human beings so dear 
to him that the remainder of  a life saved by sacrificing their happiness to his own would be 
worthless to him from an egoistic point of  view. But it is doubtful whether many men, 
‘sitting down in the cool hour’ to make the estimate, would affirm even this: and of  course 
that particular portion of  the general happiness, for which one is called upon to sacrifice 
one’s own, may easily be the happiness of  persons not especially dear to one (ME, p. 502).
Moore is not moved by egoistic considerations. His discussion of  self‐interested rea-
sons occurs in his discussions of  egoism, the view that “My own greatest happiness is 
the only good thing there is” (PE, p. 97). He contends in Principia that egoism is self‐con-
tradictory (PE, p. 98ff.) This argument turns on the claim that if  something is good, it is 
good absolutely, and if  it is good absolutely, all rational agents have reason to promote it. 
If  the egoist contends that each person’s good is the only thing they have reason to pro-
mote, the view is self‐contradictory: for if  each person’s happiness is in fact good then 
every rational agent will have reason to pursue it. The problem is that the egoist says 
that only she has reason to pursue her happiness and that her happiness is good, but if  
it is in fact the case that her happiness is good, it is good absolutely and therefore others 
have reason to pursue it, too. So the egoist is saying that only she has reason to pursue 
her happiness and that not only she has reason to pursue it (since it is good).
Moore’s argument that egoism is self‐contradictory is not successful. One might 
avoid it simply by avoiding talk of  goodness in articulating egoism. It is not implausible 
to claim that the fact that something makes me happy gives me a reason to advance it or 
that I ought to promote all and only my own greatest happiness or my strongest desires. 
In this case the egoist can avoid reference to goodness.
It may not be plausible to avoid talk of  goodness. It might be hard to see a reason to 
advance one’s happiness or interests if  these are not thought of  as good. Perhaps the right 
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response to Moore’s argument is, following Sidgwick, to reject Moore’s idea of  absolute 
goodness. The egoist might argue that his happiness is good only from his point of  view:
If  the Egoist strictly confines himself  to stating his conviction that he ought to take his own 
happiness or pleasure as his ultimate end, there seems no opening for any line of  reasoning 
to lead him to Universalistic Hedonism as a first principle; it cannot be proved that the 
difference between his own happiness and another’s happiness is not for him all‐important 
(ME, p. 420; italics in original).
Moore seemed to give up his argument that egoism is self‐contradictory after 
Principia. In Ethics, he considers the egoistic view on which “it can never be the duty of  
any agent to sacrifice his own good to the general good” (E, p. 119). He maintains that 
it is impossible to prove that a person who maintains this is wrong. However, Moore 
says, it is self‐evident that the person is mistaken: “It seems to me quite self‐evident that 
it must always be our duty to do what will produce the best effects upon the whole, no 
matter how bad the effects upon ourselves may be and no matter how much good we 
ourselves may lose by it” (E, p. 121; italics in original).
But like his argument that egoism is self‐contradictory this argument is unlikely to 
convince anyone who is of  the view that there are at least some prudential reasons that 
limit self‐sacrifice to some extent. A position weaker than any of  the egoisms that Moore 
discusses might hold that one has at least a reason to give one’s own good or happiness 
greater weight in one’s reasoning about what to do. It is hard to think that such a posi-
tion is self‐evidently wrong.
Sidgwick does a better job of  making sense of  prudential reasons. If  there are limits 
on self‐sacrifice, this undermines his attempt to defend utilitarianism. He is all too 
aware. He gives expression to prudential reasons in his dualism of  practical reason, on 
which both utilitarianism and egoism are equally justified but deliver conflicting ver-
dicts in practice (ME, p. 496ff.).34 On his account, egoism is the view that “regards 
quantity of  consequent pleasure and pain to [oneself] … as alone important in choosing 
between alternatives of  action; and [demands that one] seeks always the greatest attain-
able surplus of  pleasure over pain – which, without violation of  usage, we may desig-
nate as … [one’s] ‘greatest happiness’” (ME, p. 95).
To justify egoism, Sidgwick relies in part on the idea of  a non‐absolute notion of  
goodness (something may be good from one’s own point of  view alone) and in part on 
claim that is connected to it about the metaphysical distinction between persons:
the distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that 
consequently “I” am concerned with the quality of  my existence as an individual in a 
sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of  the 
existence of  other individuals: and this being so, I do not see how it can be proved that this 
distinction is not to be taken as fundamental in determining the ultimate end of  rational 
action for an individual (ME, p. 498).
It is hard to take this seriously as an argument for egoism. Suppose one accepts 
that there is some plausible (rational) transition from claims about metaphysical dis-
tinctness to claims about one’s reasons for action. It is not plausible in this event for 
one to think that separateness is enough to justify exclusive concern for oneself. 
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At best, it might justify giving some preference to one’s self. But even this is unlikely 
for it is unlikely that most people arguing for views rival to egoism deny the separate-
ness of  persons.
But even if  we are not moved by Sidgwick’s argument for egoism we might be moved 
by some of  the other considerations that he puts forward in its favor. These might move 
us to a weaker position that there are some prudential reasons.
In a paper addressing some of  the main themes in the Methods Sidgwick remarks 
that support for egoism might be found in the intuition that “it would be irrational to 
sacrifice any portion of  my own happiness unless the sacrifice is to be somehow at some 
time compensated by an equivalent addition to my own happiness.”35 He notes that the 
distinction passage above supports this. There might be something to this, though it is 
more likely that separateness is necessary to get this thought going. If  we take this prin-
ciple or something like it to be one among many, it might serve as at least a partial 
account of  the common‐sense view respecting sacrifice. It might be read as saying that 
there is a reason not to make uncompensated sacrifices.
This seems enough in any case to make sense of  the common‐sense view that there 
is some reason to promote one’s own happiness or good or at least a reason not to forgo 
significant quantities of  one’s happiness or good for the purpose of  aiding or promoting 
the good of  others. But whether we should accept it might (in the case of  Moore and 
Sidgwick) depend on the strength of  the argument in favor of  utilitarianism, to which 
we now turn.
II
Moore and Sidgwick offer considerations in favor of  utilitarianism. Moore thinks they 
defeat all rivals. Sidgwick concedes that they do not show that utilitarianism is better 
justified than egoism (ME, pp. 469–509). He does think they show that utilitarianism is 
superior to common‐sense morality, which, for Sidgwick, is, roughly speaking, a 
 pluralist view with principles restricting what we are permitted to do in the pursuit 
desirable outcomes.
Moore did not argue in any meaningful way for the consequentialist element of  
 utilitarianism. In PE, he held that it was analytically true:
Our ‘duty’ … can only be defined as that action, which will cause more good to exist in the 
Universe than any possible alternative. And what is ‘right’ or ‘morally permissible’ only 
differs from this, as what will not cause less good than any possible alternative. When there-
fore, Ethics, presumes to assert that certain ways of  acting are ‘duties’ it presumes to assert 
that to act in those ways will always produce the greatest possible sum of  good (PE, p. 148; 
also pp. 25, 147; italics in original).
These definitions undermine the intuitional views of  ethics on which there are self‐
evident claims about what we ought to do that constrain or are in tension with pursuit 
of  the impartial good. He thinks this follows because, given his definitions, it is always 
possible for such a claim to be “confirmed or refuted by an investigation of  causes and 
effects” (PE, p. 149).
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Moore complained that one cannot simply “foist” hedonism – the view that pleasure 
is the only good – on us “on the pretense that this is ‘the meaning of  the word’” “good” 
(PE, p. 7). Against Moore, detractors might similarly complain that he cannot foist con-
sequentialism – the view that only maximally valuable states of  affairs are morally rel-
evant – on us simply on the pretense that it is the meaning of  the word “right” or “duty.” 
This complaint is no less justified than Moore’s own against analytical hedonism.
In a review of  Principia, Bertrand Russell argued that the open question argument 
Moore used to impugn analytical hedonism can be used to impugn analytical conse-
quentialism. Against analytical hedonism, Moore argued that one might note that a 
state of  affairs is pleasurable but still intelligibly ask whether it is in fact good (PE, pp. 
15–16). This suggests, on Moore’s view, that good is not defined in terms of  pleasure, for 
this question could not intelligibly be asked if  good was defined in terms of  pleasure. 
Similarly, Russell argued, one might see that an action produces on balance more surplus 
value than any other action one might have taken and still intelligibly ask whether it is 
right or one’s duty.36 This suggests, by Moore’s own lights, that right or duty cannot be 
defined in terms of  what maximizes impartial value, for this question could not intelli-
gibly be asked if  duty was defined in terms of  what maximizes surplus value.
Moore later conceded this argument to Russell.37 In Ethics, he did not take conse-
quentialism to be analytically true (E, pp. 29, 89–90). However, his argument for con-
sequentialism did not improve. He says only that it is self‐evident that it is wrong to do 
less than the impartial best (E, pp. 87, 93–94, 121). But just as we might think that 
this is not sufficient to turn away the claim that we have at least a reason to advance 
our own happiness we might be of  the view that this is not sufficient to turn aside the 
claim that we have at least a reason to be just or keep our promises or return good for 
good and so on.
On the face of  it, Sidgwick’s argument appears more promising. His argument for 
utilitarianism rests (at least in part) on an appeal to a set of  philosophical intuitions: 
non‐derivatively justified or self‐evident propositions “relating to what ‘ought to be’” 
(ME, p. 102n1). He thinks that to command our obedience utilitarianism must rest on 
“a fundamental moral intuition” (ME, p. xxi). He describes the set of  intuitions that he 
thinks support utilitarianism as:
certain absolute practical principles, the truth of  which, when they are explicitly stated, is 
manifest; but they are of  too abstract a nature, and too universal in their scope, to enable 
us to ascertain by immediate application of  them what we ought to do in any particular 
case; particular duties have still to be determined by some other method (ME, p. 379).
He arrives at two such principles38 from which he derives a conclusion referred to as 
the maxim of  benevolence:
P1. “The good of  any one individual is of  no more importance, from the point of  view (if  
I may say so) of  the Universe, than the good of  any other; unless, that is, there are special 
grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the 
other” (ME, p. 382).
P2. “And it is evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good gener-
ally, – so far as it is attainable by my efforts, – not merely a particular part of  it” (ME, p. 382).
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C1. Therefore “each one is morally bound to regard the good of  any other individual as 
much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less 
certainly knowable or attainable by him” (ME, p. 382).
The first of  these philosophical intuitions says that two individual goods are of  equal 
value unless they differ in quantity; variations in valuing individual goods tracks varia-
tions in quantity. The second philosophical intuition supplies a claim about what we 
ought to do, namely, that one is bound to aim at the good of  the aggregate, not merely 
at the good of  some sub‐section or part of  the aggregate. It tells us to aim at socially 
desirable outcomes. This is, of  course, an important feature of  utilitarianism. The 
conclusion is that we are obliged to promote aggregate or general good, valuing 
individual goods equally unless the goods differ in quantity.
Sidgwick is not entirely clear on the exact upshot of  this argument. After laying the 
intuitions out, he says: “I find that I arrive, in my search for really clear and certain eth-
ical intuitions, at the fundamental principle of  Utilitarianism” (ME, p. 387) and 
“Utilitarianism is thus presented as the final form into which Intuitionism tends to pass, 
when the demand for really self‐evident first principles is rigorously pressed” (ME, p. 
388). He remarks that if  in the Methods he had focused on the philosophical intuitions 
alone “this would have led me at once to Utilitarianism.”39
If  Sidgwick understands the intuitions as furnishing utilitarianism, the axioms must 
be understood as claims about what we ought to do, all things considered. This would 
then entail the following. First, that the only reason for valuing one individual’s good 
more than another’s is on quantitative grounds. Departure from equal treatment is jus-
tified only on quantitative grounds. Second, that we ought to aim only at aggregate 
good, and not at some part of  the aggregate. Sidgwick suggests this reading when he 
notes that his conclusion conflicts on the face of  it with common-sense attitudes about 
benevolence (which holds that “we owe special duties of  kindness to those who stand in 
special relations to us” [ME, p. 242]):
I before observed that the duty of  Benevolence as recognized by common sense seems to fall 
somewhat short of  this. But I think that it may be fairly urged in explanation of  this that 
practically each man, even with a view to universal Good, ought to chiefly concern himself  
with promoting the good of  a limited number of  human beings, and that generally in 
proportion to the closeness of  their connexion with him (ME, p. 382; italics in original).
There seems little reason to make this claim unless he means to rule out valuing 
another’s good on grounds other than quantitative ones and to forbid aiming at 
something other than aggregate good (at least in theory).
If  this is how the argument is best interpreted, it is not better than Moore’s. Sidgwick 
may not be declaring that utilitarianism itself  is self‐evident, but he is saying this of  its 
central elements and this is enough for him to be charged with ruling out other non‐
egoistic views as self‐evidently wrong.
There is another reading of  this argument, however. On this reading, the argument 
generates a principle that serves only as the rational basis of  utilitarianism, that is, the 
first principle of  utilitarianism.40 The argument by itself  is not intended to rule out all 
other, rival principles. It is part of  a general argument that includes in addition an 
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argument against the view that one can locate in common‐sense morality any self‐ 
evident principles. In this case the argument is subtler than Moore’s.
The more modest reading of  Sidgwick’s argument appealing to philosophical intui-
tions is suggested by a number of  things he says. First, when he states the principle that 
he thinks he gets from this argument it does not appear to rule out other similar princi-
ples. He describes it as the principle that “general happiness is desirable” (ME, p. 387), 
that one seek “others’ good no less than one’s own, repressing any undue preference for 
one individual over another” (ME, p. 392), that “a rational agent is bound to aim at 
Universal Good” (ME, p. xxi; also p. xxii), and that “sets before each man the happiness 
of  all others as an object of  pursuit no less worthy than his own” (ME, p. 496). Some of  
these are sloppy renditions of  Sidgwick’s considered position. This is not important. 
What is important is that a common feature of  them is that they are consistent with the 
existence of  other, rival principles. They do not say that there is only one morally rele-
vant consideration.
Second, Sidgwick seems to confirm this in the context of  offering a “proof ” for the 
principle of  utility. He notes that the appeal to philosophical intuitions “only shows the 
Utilitarian first principle to be one moral axiom: it does not prove that it is sole or supreme” 
(ME, p. 421; italics in original). That this is so may in part explain why Sidgwick thinks 
he needs to offer a proof  for the principle of  utility even after he has articulated his 
axioms and connected them with utilitarianism (ME, p. 418ff.). It certainly explains the 
need for an exhaustive survey and critical evaluation of  the main rules and principles of  
common‐sense morality, including principles of  beneficence, promise keeping, veracity, 
purity and justice.
Third, Sidgwick, of  course, must in some sense claim less than what is required to 
furnish utilitarianism as he thinks the philosophical intuitions that he accepts are at 
least not dissented to by many rivals to utilitarianism, including Kant (ME, p. 386).
The absence of  rational (or peer) disagreement is one of  the “characteristics” by 
which self‐evident truths (or really apparently self‐evident propositions) “are distin-
guished from mere opinions” (ME, p. 338). The idea is that a proposition’s acceptability 
is impugned if  it is disagreed to by someone whom you believe is no more likely than you 
are to be in error. The other characteristics are that the proposition must be: (i) clear and 
precise, (ii) self‐evident upon careful reflection (that is, the greatest introspective care 
must be taken to ensure that before one’s mind is an actual intuition rather than, say, a 
strong sentiment and that the plausibility of  what one intuits depends on its intrinsic 
sources rather than on what one wishes for or desires or one’s society rewards or 
enforces), and (iii) consistent with other self‐evident propositions that one accepts.
On the weaker reading of  Sidgwick’s argument, the position that common‐sense 
morality fails to furnish any self‐evident truths becomes indispensable. The case for utili-
tarianism will involve the appeal to philosophical intuitions and the argument against 
common‐sense morality. Broadly, this second argument goes as follows: if  left vague – keep 
your promises, promote the good, requite good for good – the main principles of  common‐
sense morality face no resistance: “we are disposed to yield them unquestioning assent” 
(ME, p. 342). However, as soon as we try to give them the “definiteness which science 
requires,” that is, make their practical implications precise, “we cannot do this without 
abandoning the universality of  acceptance” (ME, p. 342). Either the principles are clear 
and precise, but not agreed to, or they are agreed to, but not clear and precise.
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Here are some examples of  how the argument works. Common‐sense morality says 
we owe a debt of  gratitude to those who have done us a good turn. Most agree. Agreement 
breaks down, however, when it comes to specifying whether the requital of  benefit 
ought to be proportionate to what it cost the benefactor to bestow it or to the value it has 
to the recipient (ME, p. 349). Common‐sense morality says we ought to keep our prom-
ises. Most agree. Disagreement breaks down when we think about cases in which the 
cost of  fulfilling the promise is greater than anticipated or fulfillment is harmful to the 
promiser or to the promisee (but the promisee does not release the promiser) (ME, pp. 
352–354). Under the principle of  beneficence, common sense says that, for example, 
parents ought to do more to promote the good of  their children than good of  the chil-
dren of  strangers. We all agree. Agreement breaks down when we think about how 
much more weight to give. Sidgwick considers a case in which a family lands on a desert 
island (ME, p. 346). They find there an orphan. It is doubtful, he says, that the family is 
less bound to provide for the orphan than for its own children. This leads to unclarity. 
One might object to Sidgwick here that if  you have the means and the power you have 
as much obligation to provide for the orphan as you do for own children. But, Sidgwick 
might reply, suppose there is a conflict: you can provide for your children or the orphan. 
Common sense says that you ought to provide for your children. Sidgwick might admit 
this but argue that common sense still has no account of  how much more weight to give 
to one’s own children. Suppose I can use the resources I have to save my children from 
some harm or to save the orphan from some greater harm. It is not clear what, here, I 
ought to do. Agreement breaks down.
Sidgwick suggests that his own principles possess the characteristics of  self-evidence: 
whereas the main principles of  common sense “present themselves as propositions 
requiring rational justification of  some kind,” his philosophical intuitions “do present 
themselves as self‐evident; as much (e.g.) as the mathematical axiom ‘if  equals be added 
to equals the wholes are equal’” (ME, p. 383).
The argument appealing to philosophical intuitionism and to the  negative argument 
against common‐sense morality is not a complete argument for  utilitarianism, since it 
leaves Sidgwick needing to defend views that are required to secure utilitarianism, 
including hedonism, maximization, aggregation, and so on.41 But it might get one closer 
than Moore does to utilitarianism.
Some have charged, however, that even this aspect of  his argument for utilitari-
anism is problematic. One prominent charge is that the argument is unfair to 
common‐sense morality?42 Sidgwick demands that the main principles of  common‐
sense morality be determinate in practice. However, he does not demand this of  his 
own philosophical intuitions: they are too abstract to tell us what to do in particular 
situations (ME, p. 379).
In reply, Katarzyna de Lazari‐Radek and Peter Singer argue that Sidgwick can deflect 
the change of  unfairness because the four “characteristics” of  self‐evidence “do not 
include the requirement that they [the philosophical intuitions] should yield determi-
nate answers to questions about what we ought to do.”43
This is an odd reply.44 The bulk of  the worries that Sidgwick raises about common‐
sense morality seem to be about the fact that many of  its main principles are practically 
indeterminate (e.g. ME, pp. 342, 344, 349). Sidgwick’s focus does seem to be on the idea 
that there is disagreement over what to do in cases in which there appear to be  exceptions 
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to the broad principles that common‐sense accepts. De Lazari-Radek and Singer focus 
on the idea that the consensus that common sense seems to depend on is undermined 
by Sidgwick’s argument. But that consent evaporates seemingly because of  practical 
indeterminacy and because (at least in some cases) the different remedies appear equally 
plausible. This is enough to get the unfairness worry going. He does not seem to ask for 
agreement on determinacy in the case of  his own philosophical intuitions.
De Lazari-Radek and Singer might suggest that this objection to their reply is mis-
taken because it conflates the clarity and precision requirement and the requirement of  
practical determinacy. This might be Sidgwick’s view: he calls for clarity and precision 
in the “terms” of  the proposition (ME, p. 338). But in this case it is not obvious what 
Sidgwick thinks the problem is with the main rules of  common sense. Moreover, this is 
dangerous for him, since the terms in his principles are not exactly paragons of  clarity 
and precision.
There is another way in which to interpret de Lazari‐Radek and Singer’s reply to the 
unfairness objection. They might be suggesting that even if  Sidgwick’s philosophical 
intuitions are vague in practice this is unproblematic, for unlike common‐sense morality 
Sidgwick has “resources that go beyond … self‐evident” principles to provide the deter-
minacy.45 These are found in the utilitarian method.
There are two replies to this. First, the argument that de Lazari‐Radek and Singer 
provide suggests that we cannot determine whether to accept Sidgwick’s intuitions 
until we have a worked‐out view and defense of  utilitarianism. But we will not have this 
until, on Sidgwick’s view, we have accepted the philosophical intuitions. So, the appeal 
to the utilitarian method at this point is premature.
Second, it is not obvious that common sense has no resources to fall back on to 
remedy its problems. It might simply just point to the need for judgment when 
thinking about difficult cases. Sidgwick notes, of  course, that the morality of  common 
sense is “perfectly adequate to give practical guidance to common people in common 
circumstances” (ME, p. 361). The common‐sense moralist can say that we can depend 
on common‐sense morality for the most part and then on judgment in the knotty 
cases.
De Lazari Radek and Singer cannot dissent from this. Sidgwick notes that utilitarian 
calculations are often uncertain (ME, pp. 131–150, 413, 414, 416, 460). He finds it in 
particular hard to compare pleasures with each other (ME, p. 143); in cases of  
comparison it is inevitable that he will have to rely on judgment. De Lazari‐Radek and 
Singer agree with Sidgwick that to complete utilitarianism one needs to establish that 
pleasure is the only good. They do not argue that this is based on an appeal to self‐evi-
dence, but rather to claims about what “is, on balance, the more plausible view.”46 This, 
too, involves judgment.
Even if  Sidgwick were able to survive the unfairness charge, we still might wonder 
whether Sidgwick’s intuitions are in fact agreed to. The argument that de Lazari‐Radek 
and Singer provide seems to suppose that they are.
Consider the first of  Sidgwick’s axioms. He says that Kant, for example, agrees to it. 
Sidgwick says that the good of  any one “individual” is of  no more importance than the 
good of  any other “individual.” It is possible here that if  left vague this principle (as one 
principle among others) is readily agreed to by Kant. But that the moment the notion is 
given the precision that science requires agreement evaporates.
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If  Sidgwick means by “individual” “rational creature,” Kant will likely agree. If, 
however, Sidgwick means “sentient creature,” Kant will not agree. Kant holds that it 
is only the good of  rational creatures that matters directly to what we ought to do. 
Common sense might agree with Kant. Sidgwick notes that all modern lists of  virtues 
include rational benevolence, which “aims at the happiness of  other human beings 
generally” (ME, p. 96; italics added), and that “No Intuitionist ever maintained that 
all  our conduct can be ordered rightly without any calculation of  its effects on 
human happiness. On the contrary, this calculation, for ourselves and for others, is 
expressly inculcated by the maxims of  Prudence and Benevolence, as commonly 
understood.”47
Sidgwick has two options. He might hold that to get agreement on his philosophical 
intuitions he can claim only that they regard human good or happiness. The argument 
that it is not only the good or happiness of  rational creatures that matters, but the hap-
piness of  sentient creatures more generally, will then be one of  the extra ones that 
Sidgwick has to provide to get to utilitarianism.
This is risky for Sidgwick. The main argument he uses against the claim that only the 
happiness of  rational creatures is of  ethical importance involves appeal to the claim that 
this limitation is “accidental and arbitrary.”48 On Sidgwick’s view “the difference of  ratio-
nality between two species of  sentient beings is no ground for establishing a fundamental 
ethical distinction between their respective pains.”49 But Kant is not obviously arbitrary 
if  the limitation it is based on who is and is not in the possession of  free will.
(This might be one case in which free will is of  some significance to ethics. Sidgwick 
argues that resolving the debate between libertarians and determinists is of  limited 
importance to ethics [ME, p. 66]. It is of  significance here, it seems, for the issue of  
which individuals count. Kant thinks that it is the possession of  free will that serves as a 
way to segregate those who lack standing from those who have it.)
The second option is to argue that Kant is an intellectual freak in disagreeing with 
this intuition in so far as it includes animal pleasure and pain. Kant argues, somewhat 
dubiously, that the reason we ought not to harm animals is that harming animals 
makes it more likely that we will harm and hence violate our duties to humans. We 
have at best indirect duties to animals. Sidgwick might note that “Common Sense is 
disposed to regard this [the claim that we have no direct obligation to avoid the pain 
of  non‐human animals] as a hard‐hearted paradox, and to hold with Bentham that 
the pain of  animals is per se to be avoided” (ME, p. 241).
It might be the case that Sidgwick can bring common sense to the view that the intu-
ition applies to all sentient creatures. Robert Shaver argues that common sense agrees 
with Sidgwick’s first axiom.50 To illustrate he uses Thomas Scanlon’s world cup 
example.51 Jones has suffered an accident in the transmission room of  a television 
station broadcasting the World Cup. He is receiving painful shocks. Millions are enjoy-
ing the game. If  Jones is aided the transmission will fail for 15 minutes, disappointing 
the millions. If  we wait for one hour until the game is over a lot of  people will enjoy the 
game, but Jones will receive painful shocks the entire time and have to wait to have his 
mashed hand attended to. We seem to be pulled in both directions. That we share 
Sidgwick’s intuition explains this in part. The quantity of  enjoyment had by the many 
seems to be a reason not to save Jones. This holds even if  our considered intuition is that 
we ought not to delay in aiding Jones.
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But take another example. Singer relies on Sidgwick’s axiom in his case against spe-
ciesism.52 Singer argues that species membership is not a reasonable ground for dis-
counting the importance of  an individual’s interests; the importance of  an individual’s 
interests is determined by quantitative considerations. He argues that the good of  each 
individual (sentient creature) is of  no greater importance than any other (sentient 
creature) unless there are quantitative differences between them. Singer’s position has 
generated a lot of  criticism.53 In his argument, he seems to construe Sidgwick’s prin-
ciple as all things considered (that is, he accepts the stronger reading). Perhaps this 
explains the disagreement. But it is likely that many reject Sidgwick’s principle if  it is 
interpreted as including the suffering of  non-human animals and even if  it is consid-
ered one principle among others.
Consider another case where Jones is again injured and receiving painful shocks. 
This time those enjoying the pleasure while he suffers are very primitive non‐human 
animals. Suppose there is a great many of  them and the quantity of  pleasure they pro-
duce is great, much greater than Jones’s pain. Most will not think we have a reason to 
let the animals continue to experience the pleasure at the cost of  Jones’s suffering. 
Indeed, most will think it is obvious that we ought to save Jones. Most will think it is 
obvious that we ought to help Jones and that it is not the case that a principle providing 
a reason not to save Jones is outweighed. The quantity of  very simple non‐human 
animal pleasure is simply not a factor. This involves rejecting the principle if  “individ-
uals” is read as “sentient creatures.”
Sidgwick might, of  course, agree with the more modest principle that Kant agrees 
with. This makes his case for utilitarianism much harder and makes the appeal to 
axioms much less interesting and powerful. 
Sidgwick is not out of  the woods yet. Even if  it is true that he can get agreement on a 
less expansive version of  his first axiom, it is still true, by his own admission, that he has 
failed to show that all common-sense intuitions fail to possess the characteristics of  
self-evidence. He notes that “potential universality of  acceptance [as self-evident] may … 
be fairly claimed for the propositions that the promise which the Common Sense of  man-
kind recognizes as binding must be understood by promiser and promisee in the same 
sense at the time of  promising, and that it is relative to the promisee and capable of  being 
annulled by him, and that it cannot override determinate prior obligations” (ME, p. 353). 
Sidgwick cannot complain about the lack of  full specificity here. This principle is no less 
vague than his intuition of  universality: “it cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in 
which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different 
individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or circumstance 
of  the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of  treatment” (ME, 
p. 380). This throws the onus probandi on a man who treats others in a way that he would 
object to being treated himself  (ME, p. 380). The principle of  promise keeping might place 
the onus probandi on those claiming to be able to override a promise on other grounds.
Sidgwick remarks that in his campaign against common‐sense morality he refrained 
from “entering at length into the psychogonical question as to the origin of  apparent 
moral intuitions” (ME, p. 383). Such an inquiry is “superfluous,” he says, since “direct 
reflection shows me they have no claim to be … taken … as absolutely and without qual-
ification true” (ME, p. 383). He argues that “no psychogonical theory has ever been put 
forward professing to discredit the propositions that I regard as really axiomatic, by 
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showing that the causes which produced them were such as had a tendency to make 
them false” (ME, p. 383).
It might not be true that this argument is superfluous in light of  the difficulties with 
the “direct” refection argument and the prolonged attempt to show that “from such reg-
ulation of  conduct as the Common Sense of  mankind really supports, no proposition 
can be elicited which, when fairly contemplated, even appears to have the characteristic 
of  a scientific axioms” (ME, p. 360).54
But he has to be careful that such an inquiry – e.g. into the evolutionary origins of  
the judgements – does not (i) impugn the rival propositions only because important nor-
mative questions have been begged and (ii) impugn the rival propositions but only at the 
expense of  impugning the ones that Sidgwick accepts. This may be his best hope and so 
worth the risk.
III
Sidgwick and Moore disagree most sharply over what has non‐instrumental value (dis-
value). As noted, Sidgwick endorses quantitative hedonism. Moore devoted much space 
to pointing out its flaws. He developed his own, pluralistic axiology in opposition to it.
Sidgwick endorses hedonism in part on pragmatic grounds: “If  we are not to system-
atize human activities by taking Human Happiness as their common end, on what 
other principles are we to systematize them?” (ME, p. 406). He seeks a common stan-
dard by which to determine the comparative value of  other putative goods (e.g. 
knowledge, virtue, freedom, and so on) as against each other and happiness. The idea is 
to compare all non‐hedonic values ultimately in terms of  the pleasure and pain they 
produce. He thinks this form of  systematization is the only one worthy of  “serious 
consideration” (ME, p. 406).
This argument did not appeal to Moore. He noted at the conclusion of  Principia that
We have no title whatever to assume that the truth on any subject‐matter will display such 
symmetry as we desire to see – or (to use the common vague phrase) that it will possess any 
particular form of  ‘unity.’ To search for ‘unity’ and ‘system,’ at the expense of  truth, is not 
… the proper business of  philosophy however universally it has been the practice of  philos-
ophers (PE, p. 222).55
Fortunately, this is not Sidgwick’s only argument for hedonism. As noted, he admits 
that our ability to compare pleasures is limited (ME, p. 142ff.). It not clear, then, how 
much better, practically speaking, it is to compare pleasure with pleasure as opposed to 
pleasure with knowledge or knowledge with virtue. He even seems to note in some cases 
that balancing values requires appeal to judgment.56
Sidgwick wields his systematization argument against pluralistic views. His claim is 
that while it might be true that there are great many uncertainties plaguing hedonistic 
calculations, the uncertainties associated with pluralistic views are “indefinitely 
greater.”57 But given the difficulties in comparing pleasures that he notes this claim 
seems difficult to verify.
Sidgwick appeals to two further arguments (ME, p. 400).
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The first involves an appeal to intuition. He considers the view that in addition to 
pleasure certain other things have non‐instrumental value, including cognition of  
truth, virtuous willing, and the contemplation of  beauty (ME, p. 399). He argues that 
when we “‘sit down in the cool hour,’ we can only justify to ourselves the importance 
that we attach to any of  these objects by considering its conduciveness, in one way or 
another, to the happiness of  sentient beings” (ME, p. 401).
His second argument appeals to “a comprehensive comparison of  the ordinary 
judgements of  mankind” (ME, p. 400). He holds that there is some support in common‐
sense morality for hedonism. He notes that this argument is not entirely successful, for 
many people disagree that pleasure is the only non‐instrumental value (ME, p. 399).
He has a range of  replies to this. He contends that some of  the resistance depends on 
false beliefs about the nature of  pleasure and the moral doctrines to which hedonism is 
connected (ME, pp. 402–403), and some on improper recognition of  the subtle connec-
tion between the non‐hedonic goods and pleasure or happiness (ME, pp. 403, 405–406).
The most prominent of  these replies is that the non‐hedonic goods that dissenters 
accept are productive of  pleasure and typically “obtain the commendation of  Common 
Sense, roughly speaking, in proportion to the degree of  this productiveness” (ME, p. 401). 
We are most supportive of  knowledge when it is clearly beneficial; we tend to worry about 
the merits of  pursuing knowledge when its benefits are murky, but tolerate even the seem-
ingly most fruitless of  knowledge pursuits because experience teaches that such knowledge 
can become “unexpectedly fruitful”; when virtue threatens to harm – as in moral fanati-
cism – we tend to grow cold on virtue (ME, pp. 401–402). This, to Sidgwick, suggests that 
the value of  these things is based ultimately on their conduciveness to pleasure.
Moore raises good criticisms of  these arguments. He points out that at best what 
Sidgwick’s proportion claim shows is that there is a coincidence between what has 
value and what produces pleasure. Moreover, Moore argues, even if  it is true that 
knowledge and virtue are limited by pleasure in some cases, it does not follow that plea-
sure is the only good. It shows only that “a thing is not held to be good, unless it gives a 
balance of  pleasure” (PE, p. 92). Moore might have gone further and argued that even 
if  pleasure limits other goods, it does not follow that the goods it limits are instrumental 
to pleasure.
Moore also attacks Sidgwick’s “cool hour” argument. Sidgwick claims that when we 
experience pleasure in knowledge, for example, we have something of  positive value. 
However, when we remove the pleasure from that experience, leaving only the 
knowledge, we do not have anything of  value. Sidgwick concludes from this that since 
what remains – the knowledge – has no value itself, the value of  the whole must be due 
to the value of  the pleasure alone. That is, he assumes that the value of  the whole is 
equivalent to the value the quantity of  pleasure it contains.
Moore argues that this ignores the doctrine of  organic unities: the value of  a whole, e.g. 
knowledge and pleasure, is not proportionate to or equivalent to the sum of  the values of  
the parts (PE, pp. 27–30, 36, 184; E, p. 124ff.). Even if  when taken alone knowledge is 
 valueless, it does not follow that the value of  the whole comprising knowledge and pleasure 
is equivalent to the value of  the pleasure it contains. As Moore puts it: “the value of  a whole 
must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of  the values of  its parts” (PE, p. 28). 
The value of  the whole might be much greater than the sum of  the value that the parts 
have when considered alone.
0004224380.INDD   301 1/23/2019   3:35:10 PM
ANTHONY SKELTON
302
Moore has other arguments against hedonism, including that there are evil plea-
sures (PE, p. 214) and, of  course, that things other than states of  mind – e.g. beautiful 
worlds that no one will ever be in a position to experience – have value (PE, pp. 83–84, 
189). Although quite well known, Moore does not place much weight on this second 
argument (PE, p. 189); in Ethics the argument disappeared, and Moore’s view was that 
“nothing can be an intrinsic good unless it contains both some feeling and also some 
other form of  consciousness” (E, p. 129; italics in original).
Sidgwick might try to reply to some of  these arguments by highlighting the paradox of  
happiness – that happiness is best sought indirectly through non‐hedonic goods rather 
than directly – and how pursuing non‐hedonic goods under the belief  that they are ends 
in themselves is integral to its solution (ME, pp. 405–406). This might weaken the com-
mitment to non‐hedonic goods. Sidgwick might also attack the principle of  organic unities 
on grounds that it is rather mysterious that things that have no or little value themselves 
can when they combine to produce a whole create something of  great value. Or he might 
argue that when you have (say) pleasure in knowledge you have a new, distinctly pleasur-
able state and this accounts for the greater value over the knowledge and the pleasure 
taken alone.
It is not clear that these replies will deflect all of  Moore’s worries. Revealing that 
certain goods are part of  an indirect strategy may not be sufficient to show that their 
value lies in happiness alone. For Sidgwick to succeed, it is likely that part of  his 
argument will have to include some strategy for impugning rival intuitions (e.g. a 
debunking argument). This is now the standard strategy for defending hedonism.58
Moore is likely to reply to any such debunking argument that it is more likely that 
his intuitions track objective axiological truth than that the argument impugning his 
appeal to them is true. Which way we decide to go may depend on the main features of  
Moore’s view, to which we now turn.
Sidgwick took it to be beyond cavil that pleasure is a non‐instrumental good (ME, p. 406). 
In Principia, Moore says pleasure has some non‐instrumental value, even if  slight (PE, pp. 
188, 212). However, his considered view seems to be that pleasure lacks non‐instrumental 
value. In Ethics he says that “it does … seem as if  every intrinsic good must be a complex 
whole containing a considerable variety of  different factors – as if, for instance, nothing so 
simple as pleasure by itself, however intense, could ever be any good” (E, p. 129).59
It is not clear what Moore means by “pleasure by itself.” He suggests that he means by 
this that there exists pleasure and “nothing else whatever.”60 It is not obvious that it is pos-
sible for there to be pleasure and nothing else. Pleasure is typically taken in something. 
But suppose it is possible to have just pleasure alone by taking (say) a pleasure pill. It is 
simple, let us suppose. But does this make it valueless? Adding it to one’s experience 
seems at least prima facie to make one’s state of  affairs at least to some extent better.
It is not clear what Moore’s considered view is on pain. It is possible that his view is 
that while pleasure is not good, pain is still evil. This would be one kind of  asymmetry 
between pleasure and pain. This is different from another asymmetry between pain and 
pleasure that he outlines in Principia. There he claimed that whereas pleasure is at best 
a small good pain is one of  the great evils: “pain … appears to be a far worse evil than 
pleasure is a good” (PE, p. 212). Here he clashed with Sidgwick who had earlier claimed 
that pain can be balanced with an equal amount of  pleasure, “so that the two con-
trasted amounts annihilate each other for purposes of  ethical calculation” (ME, p. 413).
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Moore may not in the end accept either asymmetry as part of  his considered view. As 
noted, he holds that every intrinsic good is a complex whole with a variety of  distinct 
elements, including both some feeling and some other form of  consciousness. It is not 
obvious that he also thought that every intrinsic evil is a similar kind of  complex whole. 
He says only that the characteristics that must belong to all intrinsic goods “may obvi-
ously” belong to things that are bad or indifferent; he seems only to insist that nothing 
can be bad unless is contains some feelings (PE, p. 130).
Suppose he holds that all intrinsic evils are complex wholes with a variety of  distinct 
factors and both some feeling and some other kinds of  consciousness. This would 
conflict with one claim that he made in Principia. There he claimed that the pain was 
distinct from his other great evils and from his great goods in being a “less complex 
organic unity … both in respect of  the fact that it does not involve, beside the cognition 
[of  a sensation], an emotion directed towards its object, and also in respect of  the fact 
that the object may here be absolutely simple, whereas in most, if  not all, other cases, the 
object itself  is highly complex” (PE, pp. 212–213; italics in original). If  this whole is less 
complex than what is required by the view above, Moore will have to give up the claim 
that pain is bad, since (like pleasure) it is not complex.
It is hard to sustain the claim that pain is not evil. Moore says that if  you think plea-
sure has non‐instrumental value you “imply that if an agent had to choose between an 
action which would produce pleasure and nothing else whatever, and an action which 
would have no results at all, it would be his duty to choose the former rather than the 
later. And surely this is very doubtful: it is … very doubtful whether the greatest quantity 
of  pleasure, wholly unaccompanied by any other result whatever, would be at all worth 
producing.”61 Suppose (contra above) this is right. It is much harder to think that a sim-
ilar claim about pain is right. Suppose one said that it would be doubtful whether the 
greatest surplus of  pain, wholly unaccompanied by any other result whatever, would be 
at all worth avoiding. This is not doubtful. If  one had to choose between an action that 
would produce the greatest surplus of  pain, and nothing else whatever, and an action 
that had no results at all, it would not be doubtful that one had reason not to choose the 
former. It is likely that by adding pain to one’s experience one’s situation is made worse.
This gives Moore some reason to think that while it might be true that all intrinsic 
goods are complex wholes, including both some feeling and some other form of  con-
sciousness this is not true of  all intrinsic evils. Some of  these might not be complex and 
might include only some feelings and no other form of  consciousness.
Moore articulated another asymmetry associated with pain and pleasure. In Ethics, 
he maintains that whereas all valuable wholes must contain some pleasure, it is not the 
case that all evil wholes must contain some pain. The only requirement is that nothing 
can be bad unless it includes some feeling (E, p. 130). This seems right, for perhaps he is 
thinking that, for example, taking pleasure in one’s own ignorance is bad.
Moore frequently suggests that the truth in hedonism seems to be that no whole is 
valuable unless it includes some pleasure (PE, pp. 93, 213; E, pp. 86, 126). This forms 
the basis of  his own two great goods, which are the enjoyment of  beauty and personal 
affections (PE, p. 189). The enjoyment of  beauty is a valuable organic whole, including 
a cognition of  the beautiful qualities of  objects and an emotion appropriate or just or 
proper to those qualities. The value of  this whole can be enhanced when the object 
exists, and one believes it (that is, the value of  the whole is enhanced by the addition of  
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true belief). None of  these constituents possesses much value on their own (PE, pp. 191, 
199). The value of  the whole, then, is much greater than the value of  the sum of  the 
values of  the parts comprising them. To illustrate, the enjoyment taken in Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony involves a cognition of  the melodic and symphonic relations in the 
piece of  music and an emotion appropriate to those relations. The enjoyment of  these 
relations is one of  the most valuable states of  consciousness that we know, even though 
the parts by themselves are of  little or no value. If  the melodic and symphonic relations 
exist and one believes it, the whole is of  even greater value.
Moore’s other great value is the pleasure of  personal intercourse or personal affec-
tions. It involves all of  the features of  the aesthetic enjoyment (a cognition of  beautiful 
qualities and an appropriate emotion). If  true belief  is present, the whole’s value is 
enhanced. The only thing distinct from aesthetic appreciation is that the thing appreci-
ated – a person – must not only be beautiful but also truly good (PE, p. 203). The affec-
tion felt towards a person comprises admiring their admirable mental qualities, 
principally their contemplation of  beauty and/or other persons, in which case the affec-
tion involves appreciating other people’s appreciations. But mental qualities are not the 
only things admired: “it is certain that in all actual cases of  valuable affection, the bodily 
expressions of  character, whether by looks, by words, or by actions, do form part of  the 
object towards which the affection is felt, and that the fact of  their inclusion appears to 
heighten the value of  the whole state” (PE, p. 203).
Moore’s view is open to many challenges. I will survey three. These relate to the 
strong presence of  the contemplation of  beauty in the view.
Moore defines beauty as “that of  which the admiring contemplation is good in itself. 
That is to say: To assert that something is beautiful is to assert that the cognition of  it is 
an essential element in one of  the intrinsically valuable wholes we have been discuss-
ing” (PE, p. 201). This seems to make Moore’s claim that the contemplation of  beauty is 
good a near tautology, for saying that the contemplation of  beauty is good is saying that 
it is good to contemplate what it is good to contemplate.62
Some suggest that Sidgwick’s view of  pleasure makes his claim that pleasure is 
good a tautology.63 His considered view is that pleasure is best “defined as feeling 
which the sentient individual at the time of  feeling it implicitly or explicitly appre-
hends to be desirable; – desirable, that is, when considered merely as feeling, and not 
in respect of  any of  its objective conditions or consequences, or of  any facts that 
come directly within the cognizance and judgement of  others besides the sentient 
individual” (ME, p. 131; also p. 129). On this view, the claim that pleasure is good is 
not a tautology. It is the claim that feelings which are apprehended or seem to be good 
are in fact good. But on some occasions, he says that pleasure is defined simply as 
desirable feelings: “a feeling that is preferable or desirable, considered merely as a 
feeling.”64 On this view the claim that pleasure is desirable is a near tautologous. To 
say that pleasure is good is to say that good feelings are good.
If  Sidgwick sticks to the first definition of  pleasure, he can avoid the tautology charge. 
His claim is that pleasure is equivalent to feelings that are apprehended or seem to be 
desirable. This definition does not entail that they are desirable. There is room for doubt. 
The claim that pleasure is good is not, then, insignificant. His idea is that in the absence 
of  defeaters of  this apprehension or belief  the feelings are in fact good.
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Moore might borrow from Sidgwick. Moore can argue that a plausible way to define 
beauty is in terms of  that of  which the admiring contemplation appears or is apprehended 
to be good in itself. To say that something is beautiful is to say that the cognition of  it 
appears or is apprehended to be an essential element in one of  the intrinsically valuable 
wholes. In this case, when Moore says the contemplation of  beauty is good his claim is 
not tautologous.
Of  course, this is not to suggest that this definition of  beauty is unproblematic. There 
may well be other worries with it, as there are with Sidgwick’s view of  pleasure. The 
point is that by defining beauty using the notion of  appearance or apprehension he can 
avoid the tautology charge.
This is important to Moore. He thinks that the wrong definition of  beauty can be 
disastrous to aesthetic argument. He notes that some have defined beauty in terms of  
what produces “certain effects upon our feelings” (PE, p. 201). On this view, he says that 
a thing could be both beautiful and not beautiful at the same time. He remarks that as 
in ethics the naturalistic fallacy has been commonly committed in aesthetics and has 
“introduced as many errors into Aesthetics as into Ethics” (PE, p. 201).65
Another worry targets one of  Moore’s great evils. One of  the great evils includes “an 
enjoyment or admiring contemplation of  things which are themselves evil or ugly” (PE, 
p. 208). The evil is an organic whole including both a cognition and an emotion. The 
whole is evil because the emotion is directed at an inappropriate object. Moore fre-
quently talks of  having “proper” or “appropriate” or “just” emotions to certain beautiful 
qualities (PE, pp. 192, 193, 200). There exist, then, emotions that are proper to various 
beautiful qualities, and when they are directed to things that are ugly the whole is evil.
What Moore says about cruelty is plausible. It is not clear that what Moore says 
about lasciviousness is plausible. He speaks of  different errors associated with seeing 
beauty in a thing that in fact possesses no beauty. This takes two forms (PE, pp. 192–
193). First, it might involve believing that something has what are in fact beautiful 
qualities when in fact it lacks those qualities. This is an error of  fact. Second, it might 
involve directing a feeling towards the qualities an object possesses but where those 
qualities are not in fact beautiful. In this case we would have an emotion towards some 
qualities that is had appropriately only to qualities that are in fact beautiful. Moore 
calls this an error of  taste. 
Moore says that these errors are “of  very frequent occurrence” (PE, p. 192). It is not 
exactly clear what error he has in mind when he discusses lasciviousness. It does seem 
to be that what he has in mind is that in lasciviousness – a passion – there is an error 
of  taste, for it is a case in which the emotion one has is inappropriate to the qualities 
contemplated. He says lasciviousness involves both cognitions of  “organic sensations 
and perceptions of  states of  the body … So far as these are concerned, lasciviousness 
would, then, include in its essence an admiring contemplation of  what is ugly” (PE, 
pp. 210–211).
It is not clear in what way pleasurable lusting involves the contemplation of  what is 
ugly. What makes the organic sensations and the states of  the body ugly or grotesque? If  
you are enjoying an orgasm or a lover’s orgasm or the bodily manifestations of  it, it is 
rather unclear that sensations or bodily states are themselves ugly or in what way they 
are. It seems odd to think that one’s admiration of  another’s beauty translating into 
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sexual desire or passion to hold or kiss that person and to enjoy it involves the admiration 
of  what is ugly. (One does not anyway seem to admire organic sensations or states of  the 
body.) If  there is an error of  taste here, it is not clear what it is. Enjoying certain of  one’s 
sexually passionate sensations or those of  another is not clearly an error of  taste.
This leads to further worries about Moore’s view. His focus is mainly on passive 
contemplation or admiration in his two great goods. In the context of  personal 
intercourse one’s affection takes the form of  admiring the mental states of  others and 
the behavioral manifestations of  them (or of  their character) (PE, p. 203). There is a 
detached nature to this admiration. Affection is not active; it passive or at least 
removed. At best, this seems one‐sided. This view cannot really explain the love or 
affection that one has for one’s children or infants. Affection in these cases seems to 
involve active nurturing, taking steps to facilitate their growth and well-being. 
Affection is not only passive but active too: it involves doing things together, building 
a home, raising children, facilitating learning and growth.66 The same passivity is 
present in the good of  aesthetic enjoyment, where the focus is on detached contem-
plation rather than on artistic creation or activity.67
Moore might try to argue that the activities involved in affection or in artistic creation 
are very important to the states of  mind that he thinks are valuable, but that they are at 
best instrumental. But given Moore’s own fashion for arriving at claims about what is 
non‐instrumentally good (PE, p. 187) this is hard to do. When one reflects on artistic 
creation or active love in isolation one might conclude that they are worth having for 
their own sake.
The disagreement over the badness of  lasciviousness and the value of  contemplation 
leads to a more serious worry for Moore. The two most valuable states of  consciousness 
are enjoyment of  beauty and the pleasures of  personal affection. Both involve the idea 
of  proper or just emotions; that is, emotions that are fitting to the object. They seem to 
depend at least in part on claims in aesthetics. For one to make an error of  taste there 
have to be truths about what counts as “good” taste or what is beautiful. So to make 
clear what these great values involve it seems that we need to make progress in aesthetic 
regarding proper or just emotions and beauty.
Moore confronts the worry that one has to figure out truths in aesthetics for his 
ethics to succeed. He notes that for his view to be complete he would have to “attempt a 
classification and comparative valuation of  all the different forms of  beauty, a task that 
properly belongs to the study called aesthetics” (PE, p. 200). He demurs, saying that he 
includes in his great goods every form and variety of  beautiful object “if  only it be truly 
beautiful” (PE, p. 200). He continues that if  “this be understood … it may be seen that 
the consensus of  opinion with regard to what is positively beautiful and what is posi-
tively ugly, and even with regard to great differences in the degree of  beauty, is quite 
sufficient to allow us to hope that we need not greatly err in our judgement of  good and 
evil” (PE, p. 200).
Moore ought not perhaps to have been so sanguine. As the criticisms above suggest, 
there are some quite serious disagreements in aesthetics. Some argue that the lack of  
consensus in aesthetics should leave us chary of  accepting that there are aesthetic 
truths. One of  Moore’s contemporaries, E.F. Carritt, argued that the disagreement and 
variability of  tastes in aesthetics is sufficient to impugn its claim to objectivity.68 He 
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argues in favor of  an error theory about aesthetic judgments. He claims that though 
our aesthetic judgments purport to describe an objective aesthetic reality they fail to do 
so because there are no objective truths in aesthetics. He appeals to the fact of  disagree-
ment to arrive at this conclusion. (He thinks no such argument works in ethics.) The 
best explanation for aesthetic variability is that the judgments rely on mood or senti-
ment not badly distorted views of  objective reality. If  this is true, this might lead us to 
great error in our ethics. Our ethics would in the end be based on our moods and 
subjective attitudes.
Moreover, it is quite possible that the consensus in aesthetics might be based on dis-
tortions. Moore notes that ethics is full of  errors: philosophers engage in bad reasoning, 
set the wrong questions, and so on (e.g. PE, pp. 143, 173, 188). He points out that lots 
of  ethical systems are based on the naturalistic fallacy and that many people in ethics 
had wrong views about value and obligations. He notes that the naturalistic fallacy has 
also introduced errors into aesthetics (PE, p. 201). This should make us chary of  accept-
ing any consensus in normative areas as reliable.
In reply, Moore suggests that in “anything which is thought beautiful by any consid-
erable number of  persons, there is probably some beautiful quality” (PE 200; italics in 
original). But given the prevailing attitudes about physical beauty, music, art and of  
course sexual and other forms of  passion this seems hard to believe.
Moore tries to explain away the disagreement in aesthetics. He argues that disagree-
ment is more a result of  “exclusive attention, on the part of  different persons, to differ-
ent qualities in the same object, than to the positive error of  supposing a quality that is 
ugly to be really beautiful” (p. 200). Again, this does not seem to fit the case of  lascivi-
ousness or many other cases (e.g. tattoos and body modification). When the contempla-
tion of  my lover’s beauty takes the form of  lusting after them with enjoyment, it is not 
clear, if  this is in fact a case of  lasciviousness, that the error is not (for Moore) one of  
taking something that is ugly to be beautiful. It is anyway hard to figure out the precise 
error. This seems to be true of  many aesthetic disagreements.
Moore might be able to overcome some of  these worries. But if  his aim is to avoid 
error in his ethical view, he must show to what extent the kinds of  problems that he 
finds in ethics are not present in aesthetics.
IV
This chapter aimed to compare Sidgwick and Moore on a range of  issues in normative 
ethics. Part one compared their versions of  utilitarianism. It detailed some inconsis-
tencies in their views and the ways in which they related their view to prudence or 
self-interest. Part two discussed the different considerations Moore and Sidgwick offer in 
favour of  utilitarianism. It suggested that Sidgwick’s case is more compelling, but that 
his general argumentative strategy is beset with problems. Part three compared 
Sidgwick’s hedonism with Moore’s pluralism. Moore raises compelling criticisms of  
Sidgwick’s view and in addition Moore makes many compelling contributions to value 
theory. But Moore’s main positive claims in value theory depend on truths in aesthetics, 
which may not be defensible.
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